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Against
PHILIP

separation
HAMBURGER

IN

1802,

in a letter

to the

Danbury
Baptist
Association,
Thomas Jefferson
wrote that
the First Amendment
had the effect of "building
a wall of
separation
between
Church
& State."
As it happens,
when
Congress
drafted
the First Amendment
in 1789, Jefferson
was enjoying
Paris. Nonetheless,
his words about separation are often taken
as an authoritative
interpretation
of
the First Amendment's
establishment
clause.
Indeed,
in
the 1947 Everson
v. Board
of Education
decision,
Supreme
Court quoted
Jefferson's
pronouncement
to
tify its conclusion
that the First Amendment
guarantees
separation
of church
and state. Not only the justices
also vast numbers
of other Americans
have come to
derstand
phrase.

their religious
freedom
As a result,
Jefferson's

This essay
of Church

in terms
of Jefferson's
words
often
seem more

is adapted
from the author's
and State (Harvard
University
177

the
jusa
but
un-

book Separation
Press, 2002).
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familiar than the words of the First Amendment
itself.
At stake is the character
of religious
freedom in the
United States. In particular,
there is a danger that lingering separationist
notions will continue to affect the interpretation of the First Amendment's
establishment
clause.
This clause provides, among other things, that "Congress
shall make no law respecting
an establishment
of religion." These words say nothing about separation of church
and state, and therefore notwithstanding
the claims made
on behalf of separation,
there is reason to believe it is not
the religious freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution.
The absence

of historical

authority

It is difficult to imagine an allegedly eighteenth-century constitutional
doctrine that has as little eighteenthcentury foundation as separation of church and state. The
standard claim on behalf of separation
is that it was the
religious liberty demanded by eighteenth-century
religious
dissenters and then adopted in the First Amendment.
Certainly, were separation
the principle
of religious
liberty
adopted in the First Amendment,
one would expect to find
that it had been much discussed by these dissenters.
Few
advocates
of religious
liberty in the United States have
been as voluble and importunate
as the dissenters
who
clamored
against state establishments
in the late eighteenth century. If separation were the concept of religious
liberty that the framers of the First Amendment
took for
granted or otherwise employed,
one would expect to find
that it had been repeatedly demanded by dissenters in the
numerous petitions, pamphlets, newspaper articles, sermons,
and even poems in which these advocates of religious liberty
sought a freedom from state establishments.
Yet it is difficult to find late eighteenth-century
American demands for
"separation of church and state" or any clear equivalent.
To be sure, eighteenth-century
Americans often alluded
to particular
types of differences
and disconnections
between church and state, and in retrospect
these allusions
are sometimes imagined to have been references to a separation. For example, throughout
the period, both dissenters and establishment
clergy distinguished
between church
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and state as different institutions
with different goals and
powers. Yet they did not thereby suggest that these institutions should be separated
in the sense of being kept
apart or segregated.
Indeed, many Englishmen
and Americans assumed the distinction
between church and state
implied the necessity of an alliance between these institutions. Religious dissenters and their allies often condemned
a "union of church and state," but in rejecting this extreme,
they did not embrace the other. Instead, they usually took
care to reject only the "adulterous"
or "illicit connection"
formed by an establishment of religion. In this way, dissenters almost always avoided any suggestion that they wanted a
more general separation of church and state.
Thus it should be no surprise that the debates on the
adoption of the First Amendment reveal no requests for a
"separation
of church and state." The phrase simply was
not used in these debates, and the idea was not advocated.
Although this is not the place to recite the full history of
the First Amendment's
religion clauses, one basic observation is inescapable: In light of the failure of dissenters to
seek a separation of church and state and the failure of the
framers to mention separation, the historical claims that the
amendment adopted this principle are, at best, improbable.
In fact, American
dissenters
made demands for religious liberty very different from separation.
Although the
evangelical dissenters who dominated the campaign against
state establishments
relied upon numerous arguments
and
principles,
they tended to demand constitutional
protections of two types: First, they sought equal rights, without
respect to religious differences.
Second, and much more
broadly, some of them insisted that the laws should take
no cognizance
of religion.
It was in the context of these anti-establishment
demands that Congress adopted the words of the First Amendment. In particular,
the establishment
clause was an ameliorated version of the second kind of demand. Whereas
the first type, which merely required equality among religions, did not accomplish
enough, the second, which precluded all laws concerning
religion,
came to seem too
severe. It would have made the First Amendment
an ob-
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stacle to laws that protected religious liberty or that otherwise concerned religion without establishing it--for example, church property laws and legislative
exemptions.
Accordingly,
the First Amendment
was drafted to prohibit
laws respecting not religion, but an establishment
of religion. In other words, it was written to permit laws concerning religion as long as they did not concern an establishment
of it. This was a far cry from separation
of
church and state.
Lack

of support

for separatism

It is no coincidence
that American dissenters demanded
a religious liberty very different from separation of church
and state, for they did not want separation.
Their distaste
for separation may come as a surprise, but it is important
to recall, because it explains why separatism
is without
historical authority.
Many American dissenters in the late eighteenth century
would have been familiar with the idea of separation between church and state, but they knew it as an establishment
accusation rather than an anti-establishment
demand. It was
a notion that establishment
ministers
had long used to
mischaracterize
the claims of religious dissenters. In particular, during an era in which morals were widely understood
to depend upon religion, the suggestion that dissenters sought
to separate either church from state or religion from government implied they hoped to separate government from the
foundations of morality. As it happens, dissenters did not
demand a separation of church and state. Yet establishment
ministers found it advantageous to hint that dissenters sought
this because it made the dissenters'
demands for religious
liberty seem disreputable.
Already in the late sixteenth century, Richard Hooker
attributed
separation
to dissenters.
In his voluminous
Of
the Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity, this learned Anglican
apologist had suggested that the arguments of English dissenters against the government-appointed
Anglican prelacy
did not make sense, "unless they against us should hold
that the Church and the Commonwealth
are two both distinct and separate
societies,
of which two the one
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always persons
not belonging
to the other."
view, dissenters
seemed
to be arguing
from
that walls existed
between
church
and com-

monwealth,
and that "the walles
of separation
between
these
two must for ever be upheld."
Dissenters
had not
actually
demanded
"walles
of separation"
between
church
and commonwealth,
as Hooker
practically
admitted.
But
he surely was pleased
to believe
that dissenters
built their
arguments
demolish

it.

on

this

foundation,

for

then

he

could

easily

Almost
gland or
tion. On
tended
to

no dissenters,
whether
in sixteenth-century
Eneighteenth-century
America,
took such a posithe contrary,
like establishment
ministers,
they
assume
that some connections
between
church

and state were unavoidable
and even valuable.
They typically opposed
any civil establishment
of religion,
and they
therefore
rejected
some of the institutional
connections
between
church
and state. But they had no desire
to prevent all connections.
In particular,
they tended
to share
with establishment
ministers
a hope for a civil society
in
which religious
societies
were supportive
of civil law and
in which civil law protected
the rights of religious
societies. For example,
most dissenters
assumed
that they assisted
government
by encouraging
morality,
by praying
for government,
and by upholding
the sanctity
of oaths.
By the same token,
they needed
government
to provide
legal protection
for their church
property,
to give legal
effect to marriages
conducted
by their clergy,
and to protect the freedom
of their
preachers
in expounding
faith
and morality
to the people,
including
with respect
to politics. Dissenters
also expected
government
to protect the religion of the people in more active ways, such as by passing
laws prohibiting
Sunday labor or even requiring
observance
of the Sabbath. American
dissenters
therefore
had every reason to share with establishment
ministers
the sense that a
separation
of church and state was disreputable.
It should
thus come as no surprise
that the dissenters
did not demand
"separation
of church
and state,"
and that
this phrase
does not appear
in the Constitution.
Nor is it
plausible
that (as is sometimes
suggested
as a fallback
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position) separation is an understated but underlying principle of the First Amendment.
Separation
was simply not
what religious dissenters or their advocates wanted.
Nativist

prejudice

How, then, did separation come to be considered a constitutional principle? The phrase "separation
of church and
state" became popular as part of American constitutional
law largely through the effect of fear and animosity that
can justly be considered
prejudice.
Though often praised
as the desire of eighteenth-century
minorities,
separation
has, in fact, a later and very different genealogy.
It entered American constitutional
law through the importunate
demands of various nineteenthand twentieth-century
majorities,
which embraced
separation
in response to their
anxieties about ecclesiastical
authority, especially that which
they associated with the Catholic church.
Of course, just because separation was used by prejudiced groups in the past does not mean its current supporters--or
even all of its past advocates--have
been prejudiced. Nonetheless,
the early history of separation
is revealing and should not be minimized. Some advocates of
separation may attempt to discount the bigotry or downplay
the importance
of the more prejudiced supporters of separation in establishing
this idea in American constitutional
law. Yet while the good faith of the current advocates of
separation should not be questioned,
the obvious prejudice
of many of their predecessors
begs attention. In particular, this prejudice needs to be recognized
and examined
for what it reveals about separation.
The phrase "separation
between church and state" first
entered popular American political debates during the election of 1800 and its aftermath.
As previously
noted, the
phrase is ordinarily
attributed
to Jefferson,
but he was
following
a path already laid out by his fellow Republicans. Federalist clergymen had preached that Jefferson was
an infidel and therefore
unworthy
to be president,
and
Republican
propagandists
responded by arguing that clergymen should keep religion and politics separate. Blending both anti-establishment
and anticlerical sentiments, these
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Republicans
used a version of the idea of separation to
condemn Federalist ministers for speaking about politics.
Jefferson himself feared the New England Federalist clergy,
their establishments,
and above all, their claims of ecclesiastical authority.
In 1802, after becoming president, he
answered
a letter from the Danbury Baptist Association
by echoing the electioneering
rhetoric: "I contemplate
with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature
should 'make no law
respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting
the
free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation
between Church & State." Although today venerated as a
statement of religious liberty, Jefferson's
letter was also a
profoundly anticlerical,
political condemnation
of the New
England clergy for exercising their First Amendment rights
of speech and press. The implications
of the phrase "separation of church and state" were not lost on Jefferson's
contemporaries,
and the words did not become popular
outside of some Republican
and, later, Jacksonian
political circles.
In the 1840s, however, anti-Catholic
Americans elevated
separation to an American ideal, thereby beginning a century-long process by which popular prejudice would lead
to the adoption of separation
as a constitutional
"right."
In particular,
many American Protestants
who were proud
of being native-born citizens formed nativist organizations
and political parties that campaigned
against Catholic immigration
and Catholic
influence
in American
politics.
Nativists and other anti-Catholic
Protestants
objected to a
wide range of connections between the state and the Catholic church. For example, they condemned Catholic preaching on politics, coordinated
Catholic voting, the appointment of Catholic teachers and officeholders,
and the use
of public funds for Catholic schools (even if distributed
to schools in general on the basis of entirely secular qualifications).
Although these practices did not amount to an
establishment
of religion as traditionally
understood,
they
seemed to violate the separation of church and state, which
the nativists elevated as a republican and "American"
constitutional ideal in opposition to the hierarchical and for-
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eign practices of the Catholic church. Indeed, separation
seemed the primary defense available to the United States in
the coming conflict that many Protestants
anticipated between Americanism
and Catholicism,
and to which they often attributed eschatological significance.
Of course, in far greater numbers than Catholics, Protestants also introduced
religion into politics and government. They preached on politics, voted on religious grounds,
and demanded that public school funds be used in support
of their own religion. Unlike Catholics,
who were a minority, Protestants
were numerous
enough to expect almost exclusive control over politics and education. In fact,
Protestants
exercised
a profound dominance
over public
educational
institutions.
Yet when nativists and other Protestants
insisted upon
separation of church and state, they had no sense of any
inconsistency,
for they were demanding separation of church
from state rather than a separation
of religion or Christianity from government.
Catholicism
was a church, and
its beliefs seemed to be imposed on individuals
by a deceptive and imperious
hierarchy.
In contrast,
Christianity--especially
Protestant Christianity--was
understood to
be a religion freely chosen by individuals,
as evident from
their diverse denominations.
Accordingly,
for many Protestants well into the twentieth
century, there seemed a
necessity of separating church and state, but there seemed
no need to separate Christianity
or religion from the state.
In addition to popularizing
"separation
of church and
state," nativists cultivated the ugly tactic of wrapping discriminatory
ideals in the American flag. Insisting that their
point of view was the only "American"
perspective,
they
condemned their opponents as un-American.
In particular,
they pressured their fellow Americans to acknowledge
that
separation of church and state was the nation's
religious
liberty. In this way, nativists created an oppressive
culture of "Americanism,"
in which they demanded a heightened sense of identity with their vision of American ideals, including separation of church and state.
Prominent
among the nativist advocates
of separation
was the Ku Klux Klan. This was the second Klan, founded
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in 1915, which reached the peak of its influence during
the first half of the 1920s. The myriad nativist organizations that advocated separation in opposition to the Catholic
church went under names such as the American Protective
Association,
the Guardians
of Liberty, the True Americans, and the League of Protestant Women. In the twentieth century, however, none was as popular and powerful
as the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan appealed to anti-Catholic
animosities
with the attractively
American ideal of separation, which it celebrated
in its recruiting
materials,
its
pamphlets,
its Oath of Allegiance,
and its Creed. The
Klan was only one of many nativist groups that inculcated
separation,
but more than any other in the twentieth century, it seared the principle of separation into the minds
of Americans.
Liberal

fears

and animosities

Separation
appealed
not only to nativists
and others
with nativist sympathies
but also, more generally,
to all
who adopted a theologically
liberal posture in opposition
to the Catholic church.
In attacking Catholicism, many nativists drew upon theologically liberal ideals, according to which, perhaps more
than legal constraints, mental influence threatened religious
liberty. With such ideals as freedom from mental oppression,
nativists in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (including the men and women of the Klan) condemned the
Catholic church for claiming an ecclesiastical
authority that
seemed to threaten the intellectual independence of individuals. Against this church authority, which seemed to make
Catholic voters and elected officials mere tools of the church
and thus a threat to republican government, nativists demanded a separation of church and state.
These nativists were soon joined by many other Protestants. Although Protestants
were themselves much divided
over theological
liberalism, they found unity in adopting a
theologically
liberal stance against Catholicism.
From this
perspective,
many Protestants
welcomed and adopted nativist demands for a separation of church and state.
Some Protestants--some
of those who were theologi-
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cally liberal--expanded
the notion of separation. They took
this perspective further than most nativists and other Protestants in fearing not only the Catholic church but also
orthodox
Protestant
denominations.
On this basis, these
liberals eventually
developed a much broader understanding of separation--a
separation
from government
of any
church and, indeed, any distinct religion.
Prominent
among the theological
liberals who developed this broader version of separation
were those who
distinguished
themselves
as anti-Christian
secularists.
These individuals
included both theists and atheists, not
to mention assorted Spiritualists
and other heterodox thinkers. Beginning
in the 1870s, many of them called themselves "Liberals"
to emphasize
that they acted on theologically liberal ideals--albeit
they applied such ideas more
expansively
than the Protestant
"liberals"
who remained
within Christianity.
Forming themselves
into the National Liberal League,
the Liberals devoted themselves
to a separation of church
and state that was systematically
anti-ecclesiastical
rather
than merely anti-Catholic.
They aimed in particular to rid
American government--both
state and federal--of
all traces
of Christianity. Although their bitter anti-Christian sentiments
and their defense of persons prosecuted under the Comstock
Laws deprived them of any chance of political success, their
vision of a thoroughly anti-ecclesiastical
separation of church
and state--a thorough separation of any distinct religion from
government--was
profoundly influential. In particular, later
atheist organizations adopted this secularist heritage and carried it forward into the twentieth century, and some small
but vocal religious minorities--such
as Jews and Seventh
Day Adventists--and
growing numbers of Protestants
and
political liberals gradually adopted its anti-ecclesiastical
vision of separation.
By the first half of the twentieth century, a broad array
of Protestants
and non-Protestants
assumed separation was
the true "American"
religious liberty. Many were merely
anti-Catholic;
others were more broadly suspicious
of all
organized
Christianity.
The advocates
of separation
included Protestants,
Jews, atheists, nativists, those who de-
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spised nativism, and all sorts of theological
and political
liberals. What united them was the particular fear of Catholicism or, at least more generally, a theologically
liberal distrust of ecclesiastical
authority. The very diversity
of Americans supporting separation seemed to confirm that
it was a shared American ideal.
In this atmosphere, judges increasingly opined that separation was the religious
liberty protected by federal and
state constitutions.
Americans
had repeatedly
been told
that separation
was the American
religious
liberty, and
that it was un-American
to think otherwise.
Even many
Americans who were not themselves
nativists or theologically liberal therefore took these nativist-derived
assumptions for granted.
Judges were not immune to such expectations
about
separation, which reached through much of American society and all the way up to the Supreme Court. Amid this
culture of "Americanism,"
the Supreme Court in 1947 held
that the First Amendment's
establishment
clause guaranteed the separation of church and state. For several decades thereafter,
the Court interpreted
the First Amendment in terms of "separation
of church and state." It soon
acknowledged
the unrealistic
character
of the metaphor
but nonetheless
attempted to apply it. In 1971, in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, the justices tried to make separation of church
and state practicable
by adopting a series of more specific
tests that they derived from separation.
In the 1980s and
1990s, however, the justices gradually backed away from
separation's
implications.
Although the Court did not expressly repudiate its earlier endorsement
of separation,
it
gradually retreated from this ideal, leaving Americans in
considerable confusion as to what the establishment
clause
requires.
Discrimination
Some caution is advisable before reaching any conclusion about the discriminatory
character
of a doctrine
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. With respect to separation, however, such a conclusion
seems inescapable.
In
particular, the notion of separation between church and state

188

THE

PUBLIC

INTEREST

/ SPRING

2004

appears to discriminate
against churches--that
is, against
religious groups and other distinct religions.
Even without an examination
of the history, it is possible to discern in "separation
of church and state" substantial reason to worry that this phrase lends itself to
discrimination.
This may seem odd to Americans who identify their religious freedom with separation, and their positive feelings about separation are not obviously unreasonable in light of the long history of celebrating
separation
as an American ideal. Nonetheless,
the potential for penalty and discrimination
is evident from the very words
"separation
of church and state."
Unlike the establishment
clause, the phrase about separation places burdens directly on religion. The First Amendment forbids Congress from making certain laws, such as
those respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. In contrast,
separation
focuses not only on the state but also the church, thus
shifting the burden of the First Amendment
directly to
constrain religion as well as government.
Fortunately,
the Supreme Court has not enforced separation in this way. Nonetheless,
popular conceptions
of
separation
as a constitutional
principle--conceptions
the
Supreme Court has legitimized--have
had a profoundly
chilling effect upon churches. Wary about being condemned
for violating this supposedly
constitutional
principle, they
have hesitated to bring their religion to bear on politics,
and in this way, separation has discouraged
them in their
freedom of speech and press and in their exercise of their
right to petition and persuade government.
The phrase "separation
of church and state" even discriminates among different types of religion. In particular,
the word "church" tends to distinguish religious groups from
religious individuals and distinct religions from an individual
religiosity.
During the last half of the twentieth century,
separation has often seemed to extend to a separation of all
religion from government. Yet even when conceived of in
this very expansive manner, separation has typically been
understood as a separation of distinct religions from government, thus permitting political leaders and public schools to
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indulge in a diffuse individual spirituality as long as they
avoid any distinct type of religion. Separation in this way
privileges individuals and individual religiosity and discriminates with different degrees of intensity against a continuum
of religious groups (ranging from such religions as are merely
distinct to such institutional churches as emphasize conformity to their creeds and hierarchies). Put simply, separation
transforms the establishment clause into a means of favoring
Americans who are satisfied with a homogenized individual
spirituality while penalizing Americans to the degree they
maintain the distinctiveness
of their religions.
This discrimination
may make sense as a matter of
legislative policy if one feels little concern about a generalized spirituality
but fears religions
and their organizations. For example, one might fear that religious groups,
their creeds, and their hierarchical
structures
of authority
pose a threat to free, democratic
government.
One might
also fear that they encourage conformity
and thus stifle
the intellectual
freedom necessary for uncompromised
individual belief. More generally,
the discrimination
may
also make sense if one fears religious challenges
to modernity,
especially
to modern beliefs in the progressive
character
of truth--challenges
that might be expected to
come from traditional, organized religious groups. The discrimination
particularly
makes sense if one distrusts Catholicism,
which has long been the model from which
Europeans and Americans have generalized
their fears of
religious groups, their conceptions
of individualism,
and
their aspirations for progress and modernity.
Yet these fears provide a poor foundation
for constitutional analysis. The First Amendment in various ways limits
government discrimination
on the basis of religion, whether
in imposing penalties or granting privileges.
Although the
amendment does not bar all distinctions
based on religion,
nothing in the amendment justifies interpreting
it in terms
of a principle that requires government
to discriminate
on
the basis of religion. By requiring
discrimination
on the
basis of religion--indeed,
on the basis of religious differences--separation
transforms
the First Amendment
into a
threat to religious liberty.
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separationism

The legal implications
are sobering. At the very least,
what has been observed here about the character and history
of separation shifts the burden of persuasion. Over the past
century and a half, separation has become an object of reverence, and it has thus enjoyed a presumption
of constitutional and moral authority. The evidence, however, shows
that separation lacks authority in the U.S. Constitution,
that
it discriminates among religions, and that it thereby perpetuates the effect of prejudice. Separation therefore seems suspect. Far from there being a presumption in favor of separation, there should now be a presumption
against it. The
proponents of separation should bear the burden of showing
why it deserves any respect, let alone why it should be
enforced as if the Constitution required it.
If advocates of separation cannot meet this burden, then it
is necessary to reach stronger conclusions. Most concretely,
after so many decades in which the principle of separation
has distorted the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the First
Amendment,
the Court should repudiate separation. In rejecting separation, the Court should also repudiate all types
of separationism--particularly
the doctrines that restate and
thus preserve aspects of separation. The aptly-named Lemon
test--which
rephrases separation in terms of purpose, effect,
and entanglement--has
already been squeezed dry, and the
Court should now expressly and completely discard it. The
Court should also repudiate any pursuit of separation in
terms of "substantive neutrality" and government's
role as
"neutral."
Although suggestive of nondiscrimination,
these
ideas perpetuate separation's discrimination
against churches
or distinct religions by depriving them and their adherents of
ordinary rights and relations to government that do not constitute an establishment.
The justices'
rejection of separation matters not merely
in the courts but also outside their doors. In 1947, the
Supreme Court adopted "separation
of church and state"
as a constitutional
ideal, and because
the justices
lent
their authority and that of the Constitution
to it, many
Americans
outside the Court have been able to use the
principle
all the more effectively
to condemn and dis-
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credit persons who, in reality, are merely exercising their
First Amendment freedoms. For example, the notion of
separation as a constitutional
right is regularly used to
decry politicians
who speak about their religion and to
denounce religious
leaders who participate
in politics. In
this way, even though separation
has decreasing
support
on the bench, it continues to be an instrument
of opprobrium and cultural delegitimation.
Of course, most politicians and religious
leaders will have reasons to adopt
their own, informal versions of separation,
but too often
they never reach this complex prudential decision because
they are led to believe that they are violating a constitutional principle. For the profoundly chilling effect of separation outside the courts, the Supreme Court bears some
responsibility,
and having given its authority to separation, the Court should now confess its error.
Incidentally, the experience of Americans with the phrase
"separation
of church and state" suggests one of the risks
of what is often celebrated
as a "living constitution."
In
hinting that the only other choice is a dead constitution,
the notion of a living constitution
denies the possibility
of
a valuable alternative and thus diverts attention away from
its own limitations. As illustrated by separation, it is doubtful whether a constitution
can adequately protect the liberty of minorities
while judges feel free to understand
rights in terms of evolving majority ideals.
Claiming to
speak for the majority of Americans and for the ideals of
Americanism,
the advocates
of separation
created a culture in which religious freedom was understood
in terms
of separation.
Like so much of the country, the justices
of the Supreme Court perceived
separation
as a liberal,
American ideal enshrined in the First Amendment,
and on
these assumptions,
they imposed it as a matter of constitutional law. The justices thereby rendered the First Amendment responsive
to shifting majority or "American"
conceptions of freedom (or at least elite conceptions of these),
and in this high-minded way, they gave prejudice the force
of law and introduced perils of a sort American constitutions were designed to resist.
Although this is not the place to parse the First Amend-
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ment, one might note that the Constitution
itself has something to say about religion. For the last half-century,
the
justices
have repeatedly
seen in the establishment
clause
various words and phrases that are not there. Rather than
hasten
to apply these
other words
in place of the
Constitution's,
thus inviting the dangers of separation and
other ideals that threaten the Constitution's
religious liberty, the justices could do worse than to linger, at least
briefly, on the First Amendment. It begins: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." These
words were not accidental,
and they provide a more Secure foundation
for freedom than the meretricious
catchwords and slogans that so often preoccupy the justices of
the Supreme Court.

